Just recently, on January 6, 2010, the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division held that business to business sexual harassment was prohibited under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
In, J.T.’s Tire Service, Inc. v. United Rentals North America, Inc., 2010 WL 26495 (N.J. Super. Jan. 6, 2010), the owner of a tire company (the plaintiffs) had been selling approximately $30,000 a month in tires to a NJ branch office of an equipment rental company (the defendant) since 1998. In 2005, the branch manager of the equipment company allegedly began to periodically sexually harass the tire company owner through 2007. The owner repeatedly rebuffed the branch manager’s sexual advances, which resulted in the branch manager withholding business from the tire company. By November 2007, the branch manager began delaying payments to the tire company and, in December 2007, the branch manager terminated the equipment rental company’s business relationship with the tire company.
The tire company and owner sued the equipment company (for whatever reason, the branch manager does not appear to have been sued individually as well), claiming that, among other things, the equipment company had engaged in unlawful sex discrimination (sexual harassment) in violation of the LAD. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendant had violated Section 10:5-12(l) of the LAD, which makes it unlawful “[f]or any person to refuse to buy from, . . . contract with, . . . or otherwise do business with any other person on the basis of . . . sex. . . .” The lower court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims.
The Appellate Court reversed the lower court and denied the defendant’s motion. According to the Appellate Court, based upon existing New Jersey court decisions (including, for example, cases previously holding that the refusal to do business with independent contractors on the basis of age, sex, or handicap violates this same Section of the LAD), the actual language of Section 10:5-12(l), and the social policies supporting the LAD, it is clear that refusing to do business on the basis of sex is unlawful under the LAD.
In reaching this conclusion, the Appellate Court also noted that such violations are different from those LAD claims brought under Section 10:5-12(a) involving violations related to employment (i.e., the far more common type of LAD claim), and which section would not have covered the plaintiffs’ claims.
As a result of this decision, all staffing firms – and particularly those who classify individuals or third parties as independent contractors – should continue to pay close attention to potential discrimination issues, and especially with the types of co-employment implications that always arise in the staffing context.